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The minimum wage in San Francisco was increased from $6.75 to $8.5 per hour in 
November 2003. This was primarily aimed to improve low-income workers' well-being, 
especially racial and ethnic minorities. This paper conducts a difference-in-difference 
model using a synthetic control group for San Francisco, looking into a possible change in 
employees' demographic composition in Accommodation & Food Services, and 
Manufacturing industries. The results indicate that the ratio of white employees increased 
significantly, suggesting that a labor-labor substitution happened in the following years of 









A new minimum wage floor is believed to have different effects on employment in various 
industries. Several articles highlight the adverse effects of an increase in the minimum wage on 
low-wage workers. These workers may experience hourly wage gains, but the hours of work and 
employment typically decrease.1 These studies are consistent with the theoretical standpoint that 
has been discussed in almost any principle of economics textbooks. However, Card & Krueger 
(1994) do not find an adverse effect of increasing the minimum wage on employment. There are 
numerous papers that contribute to this debate, and the studies use a broad host of different 
methods and case studies. 
Based on another famous paper, the binding minimum wage would not have a statistically 
significant effect on employment; instead, this increase in the minimum wage might result in 
higher employment of the younger workforce.2 This paper and a variety of other studies also 
contribute to the debate mentioned above. They can help reconcile the apparent discrepancies 
between the papers backing the employment decrease and the ones that do not – with identifying 
labor-labor substitution instead of a significant effect on employment levels. In the case of Los 
Angeles County, Fairrais and Bujanda (2008), for example, finds evidence of a labor substitution 
toward more males, high-skilled Hispanics and Blacks workers. Another explanation for weak 
evidence of minimum wage affecting employment is that the mentioned impact does not happen 
 
1 Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (2002) 




immediately after the minimum wage policy, but instead, it happens over time through changes in 
growth.3 
Motivated by this literature on labor-labor substitution, it is possible that employers facing the 
minimum wage increase might become selective in whom they are hiring based on employees' 
races and ethnicities. This effect should also be examined over a significant period rather than 
immediately after the minimum wage binding. The results from our analysis, which uses a 
synthetic control method, suggest that the demographic composition of workers in the 
"Accommodation and Food Services" and "Manufacturing" industries significant change in San 
Francisco County – relative to a pool of control counties both in and outside of California – during 




The San Francisco County's minimum wage bill was passed in November 2003 and became 
effective in February 2004. The 26% rise in the minimum wage, from $6.75 to $8.5, was the first 
substantial county-level minimum wage increase relative to federal or state norms. As inserted in 
the San Francisco County's report, the primary mindset behind this minimum wage increase was 
to help low-income employees with San Francisco's high living costs. The San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors commissioned a report to determine how a local minimum wage would affect workers, 
businesses, and the local economy. According to this report, reinforcement of minorities as the 
 




majority of low-wage workers was also the stated aim of this minimum wage policy. Policymakers 
intended that this demography of people get paid more by increasing the minimum wage. 
However, for the policy to remain successful in achieving its goal, a fixed or even higher 
employment proportion among these demographic groups needs to be observed. Suppose by any 
means like displacing these people from the area, this policy results in a significantly lower 
proportion of minorities working in San Francisco. In that case, we can assert that the policy was 
a failure. 
As mentioned before, there are lots of publications around a local minimum wage increase. But 
this question of the impacts of these increases on the demographic discrepancy of employment has 
remained unanswered. Dube, Naidu & Reich (2007) studied San Francisco's 2003 minimum wage 
with a difference-in-difference method using Almeida County as the control group. Their analysis 
looked at employment change and wages in restaurants and found no statistical evidence of the 
policy's effect on employment rates. However, they did not analyze the labor-labor substitution 
and the employment rate changes among different races and ethnicities. This paper has tried to 
motivate a framework to examine the minimum wage's demographic effect on employment by 
looking at the relative change in workers' demography – see if the minimum wage floor has a long-
run impact on employment composition. 
 
Data 
For the purpose of this paper, I used quarterly county-level panel data for the period 2001 to 2010 
as the data for our control group states are just available for this period. The data obtained from 




employment, data come from the United States Census Bureau intercensal population estimates, 
using the quarterly workforce indicator (QWI). The employment data estimate the total number of 
jobs on the first day of the reference quarter. Beginning-of-quarter employment counts are similar 
to point-in-time employment measures. The data contains county-level demographic shares for 
black, white, Asian, and Native American groups, each broken down by Hispanic and non-
Hispanic groups. I categorized the data into eight different groups for all combinations of race and 
ethnicity. This paper targets the low-income workforce using the employment data for the 
Accommodation and Food Services and the Manufacturing industries. 
The data for the unemployment rate, one of our predictor variables, is gained from the US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics database.4 I reorganized the monthly county-level data into a quarterly format 
to match our predicted variable format. I made the same arrangement for the multi-unit residential 
construction data, the other predictor variable of this study. The multi-unit residential construction 
is chosen because additional residential construction is likely to affect the county's low-skill labor 
supply. Below, the summary statistics of our working variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table. 1: Summary Statistics of working Data 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
emp white  16288 26774 0 196981 
emp minorities  18518 38419 0 393571 
 ue  7.79 3.60 2.167 31.233 
Multi-unit rescons   166.48 515.7 0 5374 
 
I merged all the eight race-ethnicity groups into two groups of white employment and minority 








Synthetic Control Method for Case Study 
For conducting a comparative case study, we generally examine the effect of some intervention or 
policy on the exposed unit and determine the difference caused by that event with the unexposed 
units. With this in mind, what we need is some control units similar to our desirable unit. Finding 
these unexposed units in some cases is almost impossible. However, in case studies on a city, 
researchers tend to find one or more cities with the same characteristics as their area of study. In 
this case, the intervention is one policy or treatment specifically imposed for the region of their 
research while it does not impact the control group. For all the deficiencies of finding suited 
regions for the control group, an approach to build a synthetic control group is introduced by 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmuller (2010). This method, which is used in this paper, enables us to 
assemble a control group from a pool of counties. This synthetic group is constructed as a weighted 
average of our pool of counties in such a way that the synthetic San Francisco best resembles the 
values of the predictor variables of San Francisco. For the aim of this analysis, the packages synth 
from Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) and synth_runner from Galiani & Quistorff (2016) 
were used in STATA 16 to produce the synthetic control estimates and to complete the 
comparative analysis. 
 




In this paper, I followed Abadie, Diamond, and Hailmueller (2010), to build a synthetic San 
Francisco from a pool of 76 counties. This pool of counties consists of all available California 
State counties alongside 20 other counties from all over the United States which had not faced a 
drastic minimum wage increase. 
I used this synthetic San Francisco in our Difference-in-Difference (DiD) model to identify the 
change in the demographic shares of San Francisco employees following the minimum wage 
increase in 2003. The demography of employment is categorized into two groups of white people 
and minorities (or non-white). The demographic share of white employees, for example, is 
calculated as the number of white employees divided by the total employees - for each specific 
county. 
In our DiD estimate, I used the data from the first quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2003 as 
the pre-intervention period. Since we use quarterly data, the pre-intervention period is where 1 ≤
𝑡 ≤ 11, and t = 12 is where the intervention happens. Also, the post-intervention period would be 
13 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 40, ending in the last quarter of 2010. 
Following Abadie et al.'s (2010) notation, let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 be the demographic share of employees for county 
𝑖 at time 𝑡, in the absence of treatment, namely the minimum wage increase.5 Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  be the same 
variable after the county is exposed. We assume in our model that the implantation of the minimum 
wage did not influence the demographic shares in the previous periods. We further assume that the 
treatment does not have cross-county effects on the dependent variable. Let 𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 be our 
parameter of interest, which is the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on the demographic 
 
5 We assume in our model that the implantation of the minimum wage did not influence the demographic shares 




shares of employment for county  𝑖 at time 𝑡. Finally, let 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 be a dummy variable indicating 
whether county 𝑖 is exposed to the treatment at time 𝑡. From the definition of 𝛼𝑖𝑡 we have: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡          (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the actual demographic share of employment, which is observable in the data. Notice 
that San Francisco is the only county that is exposed to the treatment. Therefore, we have: 
𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 = {
1      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 38 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 > 12
0                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (2) 
Our goal is to estimate the vector of after-treatment parameters (𝛼38,13, 𝛼38,14, … , 𝛼38,40). In order 
to do so, we can rearrange (1) to get: 
𝛼38,𝑡 = 𝑌38,𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑌38,𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑌38,𝑡 − 𝑌38,𝑡
𝑁           (3) 
Notice that 𝑌38,𝑡 on the right-hand side of equation (3) is observable in the data, but 𝑌38,𝑡
𝑁 , the 
counterfactual demographic share of employment without treatment in San Francisco, is missing.  
Now suppose that 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁 behaves, according to the following model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁 = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡𝑍𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡          (4) 
Where 𝛿𝑡 is the time fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡𝛾𝑖 is allowing for time-county fixed effects, and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector 
of observable characteristics for county 𝑖, In our model, 𝑍𝑖 consists of the unemployment rate and 
multi-unit residential reconstruction unit.  







derived from minimizing  [(𝑋38 − 𝑋0𝑊)
′𝑉(𝑋38 − 𝑋0𝑊)]
1




of the unemployment rate, multi-unit residential reconstruction, as a weighted average of 
dependent variables before the treatment. 
Intuitively, we can estimate the counterfactual demographic share of employment in San Francisco 
at time 𝑡 by a weighted average of the same variable in other counties. These weights are calculated 
by minimizing Euclidian (or some other) distance between the dependent variable and the predictor 
variables in San Francisco and other counties before the treatment.  Then, I use these weights for 
the post-treatment period and calculate the differences for demographic shares. 
The advantage of using synthetic control for the estimated differences of the employees' share is 
that it enables us to vary over time and evaluate the minimum wage's dynamic long-run 
demographic effect. A traditional differences-in-differences model, as used in Dube, Naidu & 
Reich (2007), fails to capture these effects and may underestimate the minimum wage's long-run 
dynamic effects. The same is true for the mean comparisons used to estimate labor-labor 
substitution in Farrais & Bujanda (2008). 
Table 2 shows the predictor means for San Francisco and synthetic San Francisco for the 
Accommodation and Food Services industry. I also added Alameda county's values, the control 
group for Dube, Naidu & Reich's (2007) paper. We can see that the synthetic control group 
resembles San Francisco better than the Alameda county.  
Table 2: White Employment's Percentage, Predictor means  
Variables San Francisco Synthetic Alameda 
Unemployment 6.22 6.22 6.57 
multi-unit rescons 308.17 308.34 451.72 
White emp percentage 2001 Q2 36.34% 36.29% 39.65% 
White emp percentage 2002 Q3 36.30% 36.23% 38.72% 





After running the synthetic control algorithm, we develop each county's weights, as discussed 
previously. Table 3 shows the first 16 counties with the most weight in our synthetic San Francisco. 
These weights are for the Accommodation and Food Services industry. For the Manufacturing 
sector, the weights would be different as we use different values in our analysis. 
Table 3: County Weights in Synthetic San Francisco 
Honolulu, HI 39.2% 
Marin, CA 11.2% 
Imperial, CA 8.0% 
Los Angeles, CA 5.8% 
Madera, CA 2.8% 
Cook, IL 2.0% 
Siskiyou, CA 1.5% 
Calaveras, CA 1.4% 
Fulton, GA 1.4% 
San Diego, CA 1.3% 
Alpine, CA 1.2% 
Lake, CA 1.1% 
Yuba, CA 0.9% 
San Mateo, CA 0.8% 
Orange, CA 0.7% 




Using the synth_runner package in STATA, the observed results for San Francisco and synthetic 
San Francisco are as follows. The results are for two different industries, and both employees' 
share of minorities and whites. I placed the results for minorities here, and by definition, the results 
for whites are precisely in the other way. I also extracted the corresponding p-values for the 







Figure 1: Synthetic control and p-value plots for Accommodation and Food Services 
  
As shown in Figures 1 & 2, the employees' share for minorities dropped in the next years following 
the minimum wage increase. The p-values support the significance of these results. In other word, 
with a higher minimum wage, employers tend to hire more white people rather than minorities. 
That can also be due to higher demand from white people but does not change the employers' 
selection behavior.  
 
Figure 2: Synthetic control and p-value plots for Manufacturing          





Same as the p-values, another way to find out about our results' significance is using the placebo 
tests, following Abadie and Diamond (2003). These placebo tests are conducted to see if the 
minimum wage's observed effect in San Francisco is relatively large compared to if we assigned a 
random county of our donor pool as the treated unit. For that, I apply the synthetic control method 
to every county in the donor pool, assuming that county is the treated unit, and then plot the 
differences between predicted and observed values for all counties. By this, I can examine whether 
the San Francisco minimum wage effect in 2003 is large compared to the distribution of estimated 
effects for the counties not affected by the minimum wage. Figures 3 and 4, respectively, show the 
placebo plots for "Accommodation & Food Service" and the "Manufacturing" industries.  
 
 












Figure 3: Placebo plots for Manufacturing  
 
Conclusion 
Considering all of the results thus far, this study can assert that employees' composition has 
changed in the following years of the minimum wage increase. Whites' demographic share 
increased, and minorities have experienced a diminishing share in low-income jobs. Contrary to 
the opinion that the rise in the minimum wage would improve the economic standard of living of 
minorities living in San Francisco County, it appears that the opposite occurred as the composition 
of minority employment within the county significantly decreased – relative to the synthetic 
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